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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

In this case as well as in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,
the statute was defended on the ground that the industry affected was
a well established state industry and that its protection from outside
interference and control was necessary to the development of the
state's resources; and it is to be noticed that not only Mr. Justice
Brandeis dissented in this case, but that in the prior case of Lemke
v. Farmers' Grain Co., s where interstate commerce was held to be
affected, he was joined in his dissent by Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Clark.
Mr. Justice Brandeis together with Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr.
Justice Stone also dissented in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,
which we are now considering, though no reason for the dissents
was given and no dissenting opinions were filed.
With these dissents the future of the attempts of the farmers
to protect their co-operative and local creameries and mills and other
institutions from being crushed out by price discriminations and
similar practices of the better organized and more heavily financed
private and nearly always foreign corporations is still uncertain, and
the question is still open as to how far a state may go in the protection and promotion of its own peculiar industries and the development of its own resources.
ANDREW A. BRUCE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF TRANSFER TAX LEVIED BY
STATE OF DECEDENT'S DOMICILE UPON BAN-. DEPOSIT ix AN-

OTHER STATE WITHOUT DEDUCTION FOR TRANSFER TAX PAID TO
THAT STATE.-[New York], An important question in the law of
inheritance taxation was presented recently in In re Scott's Estate.*
The decedent, a resident of New York, died in 1925, leaving a will
which was duly admitted to probate in Westchester County, New
York. At the time of his death he had a large sum on deposit with
a private banldng house in Virginia. That state, under its inheritance
tax statute,' assessed a transfer tax upon this deposit. This tax was
paid by the estate, after which the balance of such deposit was paid
over to the domiciliary executors and by them brought within the
jurisdiction of New York without ancillary administration. In appraising the estate for the purpose of assessing the New York transfer tax, the tax appraiser included the gross amount of this bank
account, refusing to deduct the amount paid as transfer tax in Virginia. This action was admittedly in compliance with the provisions
of the New York tax law, 2 which directed that no deduction should
be made, in determining the value of the net estate, for "any estate,
succession, legacy, or inheritance taxes." Surrogate Slater held that
this statute, in so far as it denied deduction of transfer tax paid upon
8. (1922) 258 U. S. 50, overruling State ex rel. Gaulke v. Turner
(1917) 37 N. D. 635, 164 N. W. 294. See also 21 ILLINoIs LAW RzVIEw 50.

*(1927) 222 N. Y. Supp. 515, 129 Misc. 625 (N. Y. Sur.).
1. Laws Va. 1922 ch. 460.
2. New York Tax Law, see. 249c, as added by Laws 1925 ch. 320.
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the bank deposit in Virginia, was violative of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as in effect a tax upon a tax, under
the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
3
Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

The Supreme Court there decided three distinct questions: first,
that the state of decedent's domicile could not impose a transfer tax
upon tangibles having a permanent situs in another state, nor use such
tangibles as the measure of a transfer tax upon property within the
jurisdiction; second, that the state of the domicile must deduct any
transfer tax upon shares of stock in foreign corporations paid to the
state or states of incorporation, in valuing such shares for purposes
of its own transfer tax; third, that the federal estate tax need not
be deducted. Only the first two points decided, and chiefly the
second, are relevant here. It is needless to state that as to both these
points the decision came as a distinct surprise to the legal profession
and as a rude shock to state taxing authorities, declaring, as it did,
to be a violation of due process a taxing practice which was wellnigh universal among the states,4 which had been sustained by numerous decisions of state courts of high authority,5 and which had been
approved by the Supreme Court itself in strong dicta in several
cases.6 Nevertheless, the decision has been welcomed by critics generally as putting a curb upon an unwholesome plurality of taxation.Taken with the decision in the Union Transit case it marks, with
minor exceptions, 9 the complete abandonment of the hoary maxim,
mobilia sequuntur personam, as a jurisdictional basis for taxing
tangible property.10
The result reached in the principal case seems a legitimate application of the principles upon which the second question in the Prick
3.

(1925) 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058, 42 A. L.

R. 316.
4. 24 Mich. Law Rev. 50, 51.
5. As to first point, see Estate of Hodges (1915) 170 Calif. 492, 150
Pac. 344; Matter of Swift (1893) 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096; In re Sherwood's Estate (1922) 122 Wash. 648, 221 Pac. 734; Prothington v. Shaw

(1899) 175 Mass. 59, 55 N..E. 623.
As to second point, see Matter of Penfold's Estate (1915) 216 N. Y. 163,
171, 110 N. E. 499. Contra, but on construction of statute: Hollis v. Treasurer and Receiver General (1922) 242 Mass. 163, 136 N. E. 162, 2,3 A. L. R.

849.

6. Blackstone v. Miller (1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277, 47 L.
Ed. 439; Bullen v. Wisconsin (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 473, 60
L. Ed. 830; Eidinan v. Martines (1901) 184 U. S. 578.

7. 25 Col. Law Rev. 967; 39 Harv. Law Rev. 250; 20 ILLINOIS
492; 24 Mich. Law Rev. 50. But see 35 Yale Law Jour. 357.
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8. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194, 26

Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, 50 L. Ed. 150, 4 Ann. Cas. 493.

9. New York Central Railroadv. Miller (1906) 202 U. S. 584; Southern
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kentucky (1911) 222 U. S. 63. Chattels having no taxable situs elsewhere may still be taxed at the domicile of the owner.
10. N. Seefurth "Recent Limitations on the Power to Impose Inheritance and Estate Taxes" 25 Col. Law Rev. 870.
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case was decided. Mr. Justice. Van Devanter, delivering the opinion
of the court, there said :11

"The decedent owned many stocks in corporations of states other
than Pennsylvania, which subjected their transfer on death to a tax
and prescribed means of enforcement which practically gave those
states the status of lienors in possession. As those states had created
the corporations issuing the stocks, they had power to impose the tax
and to enforce it by such means, irrespective of the decedent's domicile, and the actual situs of the stock certificates. Pennsylvania's jurisdiction over the stocks necessarily was subordinate to that power.
Therefore to bring them into the administration in that state it was
essential that the tax be paid. The executors paid it out of funds forming part of the estate in Pennsylvania and the stocks were thereby
brought into the administration there. We think it plain that such value
as the stocks had in excess of the tax is all that could be regarded as
within the reach of Pennsylvania's taxing power.

.

.

. So much of

the value as was required to release the superior claims of the other
states was quite beyond Pennsylvania's control.

.

.

. That the stocks,

with their full value, were ultimately brought into the administration in
that state does not help. They were brought in through the payment of
the tax in the other states out of moneys of the estate in Pennsylvania.
The moneys paid out just balanced the excess in stock value brought in.
Yet in computing the tax in that state both were included."
It is submitted that the situation in the principal case is not
materially different. The paramount power of the foreign state over
the subject-matter, not the source of that power, seems the determinative factor in the reasoning of the court. Whether it be upon the
theory of business situs, 12 or by reason of the practical similarity
between money in the bank and coin in the pocket,'13 or upon the
broader and more doubtful view that jurisdiction over the person of
the debtor creates jurisdiction over the obligation, 14 it is now settled
that bank deposits ordinarily do have a situs for purposes of taxation
in the state where the bank of deposit is situated. Therefore before
the bank deposit herein could be brought into the domiciliary administration in New York, the Virginia tax had to be paid. The value
of the deposit as an asset of the estate in New York was diminished
by just that much. And it is immaterial whether the tax was paid by
the executors from assets in New York, or whether it was deducted
from the amount of the deposit in Virginia. The ultimate result is
exactly the same. To adopt the language of Mr. Justice Van Devanter, so much of the value as was required to release the superior
11. 268 U. S. 473, at 497.
12. Matter of Houdayer (1896) 150 N. Y. 37, 44 N. E. 718.
13. Blackstone v. Miller supra, note 6.
14. Blackstone v. Miller supra, note 6; Matter of Daly's Estate (1905)

100 App. Div. 373, 91 N. Y. Supp. 858. The cases are quite fully discussed in
the opinion of Surrogate Slater in the principal case.
The arguments for and against this broad view are fully set forth in two
articles, Carpenter "Jurisdiction over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation" 31 Harv. Law Rev. 905; and Beale "Jurisdiction to Tax" 32 Harv. Law Rev. 587.
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claim of Virginia was quite beyond tt'e control of the state of New
York.
If this view of the implications of the decision in the second
part of the Frick case be correct, 15 then we may say that property
falls into three distinct classes as regards inheritance taxation: (1)
immovables and chattels having a permanent location, whose transfer
is taxable exclusively at the situs ;'o (2) intangible personal property,
such as ordinary choses in action,17 and tangibles having no taxable
situs elsewhere,' which are taxable only at the domicile; (3) intangibles which under any of the several exceptions to the general rule
are held to come within the taxing jurisdiction of some state or
states other than the state of decedent's domicile. 19 As to such
interests, both jurisdictions may tax but the claim of the domicile is
regarded as subordinate and the doctrine of the Frick case requires
that the amount of the transfer tax paid elsewhere be deducted before
its own tax is assessed. The Fourteenth Amendment, it is true, was
extended in the Union Transit and Frick cases to prevent double
has
taxation of tangibles, but double taxation of such intangibles
20
constantly been held not to be offensive to the Constitution.
Suppose, however, that the state of Virginia had not only exercised its power to tax the bank deposit of the deceased resident of
15. In Appeal of Silverman (1926) 105 Conn. 192, 134 Atl. 778, the
court held that a transfer tax paid in New York upon the interest of a
deceased resident of Connecticut in a limited partnership organized in New
York was deductible. This case also involved a savings account of the
deceased in a New York bank and mortgage bonds due to deceased from corporations and residents of Connecticut and kept in New York. Transfer tax
was paid upon these also in New York, but it does not appear whether the
question of the deductibility of such tax was raised. At any rate the point is
not discussed in the opinion.
16. Prick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania supra, note 3.
17. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds (1872) 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21
L. Ed. 179. Despite the strong language of Mr. Justice Holmes in Blackstone v. Miller supra, regarding this case, it has never been overruled, and
still undoubtedly represents the general rule, as to jurisdiction to tax choses
in action. Its reasoning seems equally applicable to inheritance taxation.
18. Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kentucky supra, note 9. This case
involved a tax upon a domestic corporation with respect to a number of
steamboats having no permanent situs. Its reasoning, however, would seem
equally applicable to an inheritance tag upon such property at the owner's
domicile.
19. It should be noted here that there are certain property interests
which are, strictly speaking, mere choses in action, but which have become so
closely identified with the instruments evidencing the rights as to be regarded
by business men and to an increasing extent by the law as having a physical
situs wherever the instruments are kept. Bank notes and currency, federal,
state and municipal bonds, and treasury certificates are the common examples.
Appeal of Silverman supra, note 15, held that these things fell within the
doctrine of the Prick case and were taxable only at the situs. This view has
much in its favor, but the law on the point is still uncertain. A tendency is
observable to extend a similar doctrine to negotiable instruments generally
and to corporate stock certificates.
20. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville (1917) 245 U. S. 54, 38
Sup. Ct. Rep. 40, 62 L. Ed. 145; L. R. A. 1918-C, 124; Bullen v. Wisconsin
supra, note 6; Prick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania supra, note 3.
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New York, but that its statutes provided that the fund be administered and distributed in Virginia.21 Could New York still impose
a transfer tax? Such a procedure on the part of Virginia would,
no doubt, be contrary to the general practice, which is to surrender
the balance of the property, after payment of local taxes and claims
of local creditors, to the domiciliary executors or administrators. But
is not this general practice based solely upon principles of comity
and considerations of policy? Surely there is nothing in the Constitution which would compel the state of .Virginia so to limit the exercise of its power. Could it be contended that the distributees in the
Virginia proceeding would not get a good title to their respective
shares in the property? While Virginia, might, it is true, distribute
the property according to the law of New York rather than in accordance with her local rules, it could hardly be contended since the
Frick case that this circumstance alone would validate an otherwise
invalid tax. While such a situation presents many difficulties, it
would seem that the principles underlying the decision in the22Frick
case might be successfully invoked to defeat a New York tax.
ARTHUR H. KENT.
CRIMINAL SYNDICALISm-RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH AND AsSEmIBLY VERSUS RIGHT OF STATE TO SELF-PROTECTION-LABOR LAW
-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-[United States] Repression by the State
of expression of opinions advocating resort to violent and unlawful
methods as means of changing industrial and political conditions will
receive momentum with the upholding, recently, by the federal
Supreme Court, of the California criminal syndicalist act." In Whitney
21. In a note on the Frick case in 20 ILLINOIs LAW REVIEW 492, Dean
James Parker Hall suggests a similar question with reference to shares of
corporate stock.
22. Appeal of Silvermn supra, note 15, is an authority contrary to this
view. There the estate in Connecticut was held chargeable with transfer tax
upon various intangibles, including corporate shares and a savings bank
deposit, after these had been administered, taxed and distributed by a probate
court in New York. The court in this case, however, quite clearly evidences
its dislike of the decision in the Frick case, and a determination to follow it
no further than its decision positively requires. Until the United States
Supreme Court has passed upon this problem, it may well be doubted whether
Appeal of Silverman is sound law upon this point. Estate of Hodges supra,
note 5, is also contra, but it was decided before the Frick case, upon the line

of reasoning which was there disapproved.
1. Statutes (1919)

ch. 188 p. 281.

Heretofore, the United States

Supreme Court had not passed on the constitutional validity of a state statute

prohibiting, under criminal penalties, the mere membership in a society which

had such an objective as that condemned by the criminal syndicalist act.
Various types of criminal anarchy statutes, where incitement to violence for
the overthrow of industry or State was the motive, had been upheld by the
federal Supreme Court. See Gitlow v. New York (1925) 268 U. S.652, 45
Sup. Ct. Rep. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138; Abrams v. United States (1919) 250 U. S.
616, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173. Various state courts had likewise
upheld different features of criminal anarchy statutes, as well as criminal
syndicalist statutes. Consult "Validity of Legislation against Political, Social

